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Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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13 November 1985

WORLDWIDE REPORT

ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

FRG GOVERNMENT'S 1985 DISARMAMENT REPORT ADOPTED

LD231512 Hamburg DPA in German 1427 GMT 23 Oct 85

[Text] Bonn, 23 Oct (DPA) -- U.S. plans for a missile defense system in space (SDI) are an important influence on the USSR's decision to resume arms talks with the United States, according to the Federal Government. This was said by the Federal Government in the 1985 Disarmament Report adopted by the Federal cabinet today. The text of the annual report, which draws together the efforts of the Federal Government for disarmament, will only be published when it has been made available to the Bundestag.

The new government spokesman, Herbert Schmuelling, said after the cabinet session chaired by Federal Finance Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg (CDU) that the report says the Federal Government has strengthened its efforts for disarmament and arms control in the period of the report (June 1984 to June 1985). It's political initiatives contributed to the resumption of the Geneva talks between the superpowers and were part of the continual process of consultations with the United States. The Federal Government is convinced that the resumption of the Geneva negotiations is also due to its firm stand in connection with the NATO two-track decision.

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CSO: 5200/2526

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

FRG'S BUNDESTAG FAVORS PARTICIPATION IN SDI RESEARCH

DW211313 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 19 Oct 85 p 1

[Report signed CG.: "The Bundestag Passes a Resolution Describing Participation in SDI Research as Desirable in Principle"]

[Excerpt] Bonn, 18 Oct -- Prior to the visit to the United States by the chancellor and the foreign minister, the Bundestag on Friday described German participation in research on Washington's "Strategic Defense Initiative" as "desirable in principle". This assessment is contained in a recommendation for a resolution adopted by majority vote in the Foreign Affairs Committee. The recommendation calls on the Federal Government to ascertain how such participation can be secured, if necessary, with other states belonging to the alliance -- for reasons of alliance as well as of economic-technological policy -- on fair terms of mutual benefit so that later an appropriate decision can be made on the issue.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

FRG'S RAU ENVISAGES TALKS ON NATO POLICY, SDI

DW160750 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 1800 GMT 15 Oct 85

[Excerpt] In the event of an election victory of the Social Democrats, prospective SPD chancellor candidate Johannes Rau proposes to negotiate rescinding the NATO two-track decision. This would also apply to a potential agreement on German participation in the U.S. SDI.

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CSO: 5200/2526

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

FRG'S CSU LEADER INTERVIEWED ON GDR-USSR SPACE ARMS TIES

LD121513 Hamburg DPA in German 0730 GMT 12 Oct 85

[Text] Cologne, 12 Oct (DPA) -- According to CSU disarmament expert Juergen Todenhoefer, the GDR long ago opted to participate in the Soviet Union's space weapons program. Todenhoefer, in an interview with the Cologne paper EXPRESS (Sunday edition), said: "NATO has clear and unequivocal information that the GDR agreed on 26 April with Soviet Defense Minister Sokolov to East Berlin's participation in the Soviet Union's huge space weapons research program."

According to the CDU politician, the GDR committed itself to take part primarily in the spheres of measurement technology, photoelectronics, and precision engineering. It is thus implausible for the SED, "arm in arm with the SPD," to demand that the two parties should urge their military alliances to prevent space militarization.

The article was prereleased to DPA in an edited form.

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CSO: 5200/2526

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

FRENCH LE MONDE ON USSR MISSILE REDUCTION PROPOSALS

PM241429 Paris LE MONDE in French 24 Oct 85 p 1

[Editorial: "Moscow and the Geneva Summit"]

[Text] With less than 1 month to go before the Soviet-American summit in Geneva, each of the two sides is trying to explain its positions and present them to public opinion in the most favorable way. At all events that is what is being attempted in Moscow: The main Soviet foreign policy and defense officials contributed a few elements on Tuesday, 22 October, which clarify things after the major revelations made by Mr Gorbachev during his visit to Paris.

With regard to the American Strategic Defense Initiative, it has been confirmed that the USSR is now concentrating its offensive on the testing of space weapons, known as "strike" weapons, which the Pentagon wants to continue: It sees no objection to basic research on new technologies or even the deployment of an ABM defense system, provided that defense is in keeping with the 1972 ABM treaty, in other words is limited to the protection of a single region and is ground-based on a nonmobile way.

Will the United States regard that as progress? Let us just note that the intention expressed by the two sides to respect the ABM treaty can nonetheless provide a starting point.

With regard to offensive weapons, the Soviets are now spelling out in public the arguments which their negotiators used in Geneva: Initially on the basis of the principle that any weapon which can reach the other side's territory is "strategic," they credit the United States with nearly 1,200 additional vehicles, giving a total of 3,360, whereas they only admit to 2,500 on their side. Second, and perhaps to achieve acceptance for this infringement of the practice observed in the previous SALT agreements, they in turn are agreeing to a departure from the sacrosanct principle of equality which has always been proclaimed: Since the proposed 50 percent reduction is to be applied to each side's overall arsenal, the United States will be entitled to 1,680 vehicles and the USSR to just 1,250. Finally, third, this inequality is removed by an equal ceiling imposed on the number of nuclear warheads: 6,000 on each side.

The Americans can obviously not accept all these proposals (in particular, the fact that Pershing and cruise missiles in Europe are taken into account, but not the Soviet SS-20 missiles, would place them in an impossible position with regard to their allies), but they might find some advantages in them. For instance, the Soviets are promising not to deploy more than 60 percent of their nuclear warheads on a single type of

vehicle: their arms mounted on intercontinental missiles, the ICBM's which worry the United States most, would thus be reduced to a maximum of 3,600 warheads as against almost twice that number at present.

The package of Soviet proposals therefore contains something substantial. In any event it contains enough to arouse hope that the Geneva summit marks the start of negotiations which are more promising than hitherto. Of course this is providing Mr Reagan overcomes the disagreements in his team and imposes a consistent strategy on his negotiators. This seems to be far from an established fact.

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CSO: 5200/2531

REPORT ON FRENCH PROPOSALS, FUNDING FOR EUREKA

Paris ELECTRONIQUE ACTUALITES in French 6 Sep 85 p 2

[Article signed R.V.: "France Will Devote FF 1 Billion to it in 1986; 17 European Countries Join to Launch Eureka"]

[Text] Officially, Eureka was born. But this new European technological cooperation program should not be actually operational before next November. However, France has already announced that, in 1986, it will devote FF 1 billion to Eureka (FF 350 million provided by the PTT [Post and Telecommunications Administration], FF 350 million by the Ministry of Research, and FF 300 million in loans from the Industrial Modernization Fund). As a basis for negotiations, it also presented a first list of possible projects. And Mr Yves Sillard, formerly at CNES [National Center for Space Studies] and now president of the French Institute for Research on Ocean Development, will be responsible for Eureka coordination on the French side; contacts between the authorities and interested manufacturers, preparation of draft agreements between companies, etc.

"Depending on how fast the program takes off, the French government will adjust its financial support," Mr Mitterrand pointed out on 17 July, at an international conference that brought together in Paris the ministers of 17 European countries and marked the official creation of Eureka. As is known, the project was first proposed by Mr Mitterrand last April.

A second Eureka conference, to be attended by the research ministers of these 17 countries, will take place on 5-6 November 1986 in Hanover (FRG); after the kickoff given in Paris, the November conference will further outline the program: organizational structures, financing conditions, working methods, initial project inventory, etc. In addition, during this month of September, a meeting more particularly devoted to financing problems of future Eureka projects will be held in London.

These projects, all related to high technologies, will have to be concrete civilian projects (although, as is acknowledged, due to its technological

character Eureka will have some military fallout). "Adaptable," "flexible," Eureka will not lead to the creation of a new agency. For each project-- needing probably the support of at least three countries--a mini-secretariat could be created. The projects would be financed case by case, each with a well-defined financial package, objectives and time limits. Public funds will represent only part of the Eureka financing, the remainder being provided by the manufacturers themselves and probably also by financial institutions.

The Eureka projects will have to lead to commercial applications, the French Ministry of Research pointed out. By comparison, ESPRIT [European Strategic Program for R&D in Information Technology] finds itself "further upstream of the market," it was added.

The French Proposals

In their current discussions with other European countries, French negotiators rely on a document that France presented at the 17 July meeting. Entitled "The Technological Renaissance of Europe," the document was established by CESTA (Research Center for Advanced Systems and Technology) on behalf of the government. It proposes a (non-exhaustive) list of finalized projects, in particular in the fields of data processing, telecommunications, robotics and materials. For each of these projects, this official working document lists a number of possible partners, companies or research organizations.*

Among other projects, France is proposing the development of: a large 30-giga-flop vector computer; a data-processing machine with a high degree of parallelism and a power in excess of 10 gigaflops; and a synchronous-architecture multiprocessor machine. These three projects would be completed by 1992.

As far as mass memories are concerned, France is suggesting the development of large storage disks with very large capacities.

* We should mention in particular the following: DGT [General Directorate of Telecommunications], Bull, Thomson, Siemens, INRIA [National Institute of Data-Processing and Information Research], CNET [National Center for Telecommunications Studies], CNRS [National Center for Scientific Research], Inmos, GEC [expansion unknown], LETI [Electronics and Data-Processing Technology Laboratory], CEA [Atomic Energy Commission], BASF [Baden Anilin and Soda Factory], Aerospatiale, Cap Gemini, EDF [French Electricity Company], ICL [International Computers Ltd.], Philips, AEG [German General Electricity Company], CGE [French General Electricity Company], CGEE-Alsthom, Copernique, ESD [expansion unknown], MATRA [Mechanics, Aviation and Traction Co.], Framentec, Olivetti, Norsk Data, SAGEM [Company for General Applications of Electricity and Mechanics], Plessey, ASEA [Swedish General Electric Corporation], G3S [expansion unknown], Sodeteg TAI, Renault Automation, Alsthom, CILAS [Industrial Laser Company], FRAMATOME [Franco-American Atomic Construction Company], Ferranti, CIT-Alcatel, Italtel, Nixdorf, La Sep, SAT [Telecommunications Company] and Cables of Lyons.

Other proposals: the creation of a European software engineering center; the development, over 10 years, of a family of symbolic processors (maximum power: 1 gigalips [logical inferences per second]) and associated software; the study and development of tools to develop expert systems; the development of a multilingual information system (database in various natural languages, with text, images, voice, etc.); the development, by 1990, of systems to aid in the control of large industrial processes, integrating diagnostic, forecasting, decision-making and intervention follow-up.

As far as components are concerned, the CESTA document also proposes: the development, for the next decade, of a high-end flexible submicron-technology microprocessor "that could lead to the creation of a standard"; the development of memories of up to 64 megabits (by 1995).

The study also wishes for the creation of two additional European plants, one for gallium arsenide circuits (in the next five years), the other specialized in "customer" circuits.

In computer-integrated manufacturing, the government document mentions the development of various third-generation robots (agricultural robots and civil-safety robots) as well as that of a plant integrating functions of product design, management, production, etc.

The CESTA also proposes to develop high-power lasers for industrial uses.

In the field of telecommunications, France is proposing the creation of data-processing networks to be used by European researchers. In addition, in the context of the future wide-band digital network, it proposes to develop: a European digital public switching system; communicating data-processing and office-automation equipment adapted to this network; long-distance transmission means (optical fibers, satellite payloads).

Finally, another suggestion of the CESTA is to develop structural materials in order to make a high-output industrial turbine. All these proposals were submitted to our European partners and are now being discussed.

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CSO: 3698/20

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

AREAS OF EUREKA RESEARCH BY PRODUCT, FIRM, COUNTRY

Paris L'USINE NOUVELLE in French 1-8 Aug 85 pp 10-11

[Article by Claudine Meyer: "FF 1 Billion for Eureka"]

[Text] Today: official launching. In November: further detail on its financing. The European industry has four months to give Eureka its final content.

Francois Mitterrand is committed to depositing FF 1 billion into the account of the European technological program Eureka by 1986. Financing will be provided by the Industrial Modernization Fund for FF 300 million, and by the Ministry of Research and Technology and the Ministry of PTT [Post and Telecommunications] for FF 700 million. Will this FF 1 billion pledged by the government generate an additional FF 1 billion from French manufacturers? The financing conditions of the Eureka project will be tackled in November. However, as in the case of the data-processing program ESPRIT [European Strategic Program for R&D in Information Technology] adopted by the EEC in 1984 (FF 10 billion over 5 years), and the European RACE project [R&D in Advanced Communication Technologies for Europe] (FF 7 billion) designed to develop prototypes in the field of telecommunications, mixed financing provided by the states and by their industries might be the solution chosen.

For the time being, uncertainties remain: Great-Britain would like to see its industries commit themselves first. Only the FRG will be quick in following the French example: hosting the second Eureka meeting, it would in turn endow the program with FF 1 billion, i.e. approximately DM 300 million. All together, if we consider that France represents one fifth of the European gross national product, we may dream of a total budget of FF 10 billion for the first operating year, and FF 50-70 billion until 1992, the deadline for the completion of some Eureka projects.

An inventory of the projects was made by the Center for the Study of Advanced Systems and Technologies (CESTA) created in 1982, right after the Versailles summit, and headed by Yves Stourdze. In data processing and robotics, in telecommunications, biotechnologies and materials, Eureka projects have a single objective: to give enough muscle to the Europe of high technology to ensure its independence from the United States and Japan and prevent it from falling to subcontractor status.

Fallout for Five Major Industrial Sectors

Interested
French Companies

Public
Organizations

European
Partners

European
Organizations

EUROCON

DP networks for research
Lge digital switching syst.
size-building and office-
automation communications
Wide-band transmission

* Centres de recherche nationaux

MRT, CNRS, Inria

DST, Cnet

Plessey, Italtel (Ital.), Siemens

CNET, Cnet, PTT

British Telecom, GEC, Plessey, Italtel

CNET, Thomson

Bundespost, Niedorf, Siemens (RFA)

CSE, Cables de Lyon, ESD, Matra, SAT

PTT, Cnet

ANT, Siemens (RFA), Plessey, Italtel, Selenia (Ital.)

CNET, Cnet, UT-Compiegne, Insa

SES (Belg.), De Darske Solte, Faabrikter (Dan.)

AFC, Agricultural Generals Comp., Shell Nederland (G.-B.)

Royal Sun (G.-B.), Horstist, KWS (RFA), Ciba-Geigy,

Sandoz (Swiss.)

Elf-Aquitaine

Beijing, Siemens (RFA)

CNRS, Inst. Ut-Campiegne, Insa

AMF, Brush Ceramic, Hawells, Rolls Royce (G.-B.)

Alpha Romeo, Fiat (Ital.), BBC, KHD, KWU, MTU,

Rosenthal, Technik (RFA)

Elf-Aquitaine

ONERA, CNRS

Alsthom, Cetim, Hispano-Suiza, Rhône-Poulenc

SEP, Tertoméca, Aubin et Duval, Imphy,

Simec, Framatome, Pechiney, Aérospatiale

IRISI, INMOS

GMD, LETI

INRIA, BASF

CNRS, ICL

IRISA, AEG

INMOS, International Computers Limited

LETI, International Computers Limited

BASF, General Electric Company

ICL, Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm

AEG, General Electricity Company

ICL, CGE, General Association of Electrical Companies

ESD, Electronique Serge Dassault

Key:

- SINTRA Industrial Company for the New Radioelectric Technologies and French Electronics
- ONERA National Office for Aerospace Studies and Research
- INRIA National Institute for Data-Processing and Automation Research
- CNRS National Center for Scientific Research
- IRISA Institute for Data-Processing and Random Systems Research
- INMOS [explanation unknown]
- GMD Mathematics and Data-Processing Association
- LETI Electronics and Data-Processing Technology Laboratory
- BASF Baden Anilin and Soda Factory
- ICL International Computers Limited
- AEG General Electric Company
- MBB Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm
- CGE General Electricity Company
- CGE General Association of Electrical Companies
- ESD Electronique Serge Dassault

EUROMATICS		Interested French Companies	Public Organizations	European Partners	European Organizations
Large vector comp. (30 Gflops)	Bull, Santa (Thomson)	Onera, Inria	Siemens (RFA)		
Highly-parallel DP architectures	Bull, Sema	CNRS, Inria, Onera			GMD (RFA)
Synchronous-architecture multiprocessor machines	Sema, Thomson semiconducteurs	Inria-Insa, CNRS-Nice	Inmos, GEC (G.-B.), Siemens		
Mass memory	Bell	Leti	BASEF, Siemens (RFA)		
Software engineering center	Alcatel, Bull, Cap Gemini, Renault	Inria, Mines Saint-Etienne	ICL, Logica, Stetec (G.-B.), Philips (P.-B.), AEG, Dorneic	Université de Aachen (RFA)	
Artificial intelligence	Amitie, Bull, CCE, CGE, Alsthom, Capgemini, Framatome, ITIN	CEA, Casis, Cnet, Edf, Ifip, Iri, Paris VII	ICL, Immes, LPA, SOL (G.-B.), Olivetti (Ital.), Norsk Data (Norv.)	Université d'Amsterdam (P.-B.), GMF	
Dedicated circuits - symbolic machines	Amitie, Bull, CCE, CGE, Alsthom, Copanique, Matra, ITIN, Thomson	Cnet, Ifip	Krupp, Siemens (RFA), Philips		
Development tools for expert systems	Bell, CCE, Cognitec, ESD, Framatome	Iri-Dresy, Paris VII	Inmos, Norsk Data, Siemens		Matra
Multilingual inf. system	Bell, CSE	Inria	ICL, LPA, SOL (G.-B.), Techint, TTX (Ital.), Daner, Siemens (RFA)	Université d'Amsterdam (P.-B.)	
Ind. process control	Alcatel, CSE	CEA, Cnes, Edf	Société Systèmes Europe (Belg.), Philips, Krupp, MBB, Siemens		GMD (RFA)
Europrocessor		CEA, Leti, Cnet	GEC, Immos Plessey, Philips, Siemens		
64-megabit memory		CEA, Leti, Cnet	GEC, Philips, Siemens		
GeAs circuit plant	Christiane, Matra, Thomson	Cnet, CNRS	LME (Sofitel), GEC, Plessey, STC, Philips, Siemens		
Standard-cell circuit plant	Matra, Thomson	Cnet, Leti	GEC, Plessey, Philips, MBB, Siemens, IME		
EIROBOT	Bull, CGE, Dassault, Renault, Sagem, Sistech, Thomson	CEA, Cnes, Ifremer, Irainm, Inria, Labst, Leti	FN (Belg.), GEC, Lamberton, Matra Machines, Taylor Hies (G.-B.)	Programmes communautaires Brite et Esprit	
Third-generation robotics		ADL, CEA/Dep. Cen, Cesca, CNRS, Inria	RSE (Ital.), Fels, Fibro, Kuka, Siemens (RFA), Aspa (Suède)		
Civil security robots	Caroline, GES, Get, Hispano-Suisse, Technicatome	Taylor Hies (G.-B.), Fair, Melectron (Ital.), IBM (Autriche)			
Agricultural robots	Bosch	ADL, Comagiel, CNRS, Inria	Fiat (Ital.), Saab (Suède)		
Automated factory, CAD/CAM	Alcatel, Automatique industrielle, CGE, Mats, Pragma, Renault Automation, SGN, Soditieg (AI)	Adgeo, ADI, CEA, Cen, Cesca, CNRS, Inria	Fiat, Ital., Olivetti, RSE (Ita.), GEC	Société générale de Belgique, Siemens, Aspa	
CO ₂ , CO ₂ , excimer and free-electron laser	Alsthom, Carlo, LGP, Cluze, CT-Eeca, Framatome, Giat, MFM, LDH, Matra Micro-contrôle, S.N., Sopra, Thomson, Usinor	CEA, Cnet, Leti	CBU (Belg.), Ferranti, RSE, Awe, IK Lasers (G.-R.)	Dana, Nurus (Norv.), Holts Union, DFXR, MBB, Garching (RFA)	

TITN	New Techniques for Information Processing
CEA	Atomic Energy Commission
CESIA	[expansion unknown]
CNET	National Center for Telecommunications Studies
EDF	French Electricity Company
IEF	[expansion unknown]
LRI	[expansion unknown]
LPA	[expansion unknown]
SDL	[expansion unknown]
MATRA	Mechanics, Aviation and Traction Co.
MAIA	[expansion unknown]
IDL	[expansion unknown]
RSE	[expansion unknown]
SOL	[expansion unknown]
TXT	[expansion unknown]
GEC	General Electric Company
LME	[expansion unknown]
STC	Storage Technology Corporation
IFREMER	French Institute for Research on Ocean Development
CNES	National Center for Space Studies
IIRIAM	[expansion unknown]
LAAS	Automation and Systems Analysis Laboratory
FN	[expansion unknown]
BRITE	Basic Research in Industrial Technologies for Europe
ESPRIT	European Strategic Program for R&D in Information Technology
EISAG	San Giorgio Electronics
ASEA	Swedish General Electric Corporation
SAGEM	Company for General Applications of Electricity and Mechanics
G3S	[expansion unknown]
GIAT	Association of Land-Weapons Industries
ADI	Data-Processing Agency
OREP	[expansion unknown]
CERT	Toulouse Studies and Research Center
CESTA	Center for the Study of Advanced Systems and Technologies
IGM	[expansion unknown]
SAAB	Swedish Aircraft Company
SGN	General Company for New Technologies
SODETEG	Company for General Studies and Enterprises
TAI	Transmissions, Automation, Data Processing

ADEPA	Association for the Development of Automated Production
RSE	[expansion unknown]
CERCO	[expansion unknown]
CILAS	Industrial Company for Lasers
CIT	Industrial Telecommunications Company
ETCA	Central Technical Establishment for Armament
FRAMATOME	Franco-American Atomic Construction Company
IMFM	[expansion unknown]
LDN	[expansion unknown]
CBL	[expansion unknown]
RSBE	[expansion unknown]
DFVLR	German R&D Institute for Space Travel
MRT	Radio and Television Equipment
DGT	General Directorate of Telecommunications
PTT	Post and Telecommunications Administration
Bundespost	German Post Office
SAT	Telecommunications Company
ANT	[expansion unknown]
SANOFI	Aquitaine Financial Corporation for Hygiene and Health
UT	Technical University
INSA	National Institute for Applied Sciences
SES	[expansion unknown]
AFRC	[expansion unknown]
SEP	European Propulsion Company
AME	[expansion unknown]
BBC	Brown-Boveri and Company
KHD	[expansion unknown]
KWU	[expansion unknown]
MTU	[expansion unknown]
CGP	General Company for Computer-Integrated Manufacturing
L'UN	L'USINE NOUVELLE
*	National Research Centers

Indeed, individual firms can no longer afford the research budget required by leading-edge industries. According to Laurent Citti, CGE [General Electricity Company] development manager, "public telecommunications alone would require FF 1.5 billion per year. And even though CIT-Alcatel devoted 14 percent of its sales to R&D in 1984, these amounts are often inadequate in absolute value, compared to the U.S. manna."

It was therefore quite logical for Georges Pebereau's group to "enlist before call-up" for Eureka, and to sign an agreement on future telephone systems with the German Siemens, the British Plessey and the Italian ItalTEL by January.

Unfortunately, although these attempts to federate the Europe of telecommunications took place before the creation of Eureka, Eureka's baptism coincides... with the opening of negotiations between one of the four parties, Siemens, and the U.S. company GTE. A bad blow to European solidarity? At CGE, no one is taking offense. "It is a worldwide market," Laurent Citty explained, "and our European alliances should in no way prevent us from entering into others outside of Europe. Hence our own agreements, between Alcatel-Thomson and the U.S. Fairchild Industries, as well as, within the EEC, with the Italian Selenia and the German ANT [expansion unknown].

At Siemens, a more detached attitude: for its management, Eureka remains a "political project," that is vague both technically and financially. Therefore, the important agreement it signed with Japan, the other major power competing with Europe, is less of a surprise: the patent exchange that the German company is about to complete with Toshiba will enable it to market 1-megabit integrated circuits with a 1-year lead. And, at the Munich headquarters, people acknowledge that other major plans with the Japanese giant might well come off before the next Eureka meeting...

"Cohabitation among large groups is certainly not easy," people at Thomson acknowledge--in the context of Eureka, Thomson just got closer to Siemens and to the British General Electric Company and the Dutch Philips. "But they will have to learn to reconcile their agreements with other alliances signed with outside partners."

All these problems should clarify themselves progressively as the technological orientations of Eureka are identified and as it becomes necessary to deal among Europeans only... The first agreement signed in this context by MATRA [Mechanics, Aviation and Traction Company] and the Norwegian Norsk Data, 1 month ago, proves that tandems are formed when real synergism is present between partners: the compact vector computer that should be the outcome of this agreement will indeed require the Norwegian knowhow in the field of all-purpose computers and the French knowhow in that of VLSI chips.

Common interests also in the field of electronics. In 6 years, Europe saw its share of the world's semiconductors market decline from 15 to 10 percent. Only through a regrouping of its industrial forces will it be able to reach the critical size required to forge ahead. Especially since the budget required to develop the components of the future are estimated at some FF 50 billion. Complementing one another, the four electronics manufacturers of the Old Continent therefore did not wait long to follow the

example of MATRA and Norsk Data, pulling a joint research project out of their files. From the flat-panel screens dear to Philips to the microprocessors and high-density memories of interest to Siemens, and to the gallium arsenide and microwave-frequency components required for telecommunications and used by Thomson, there will actually be something for everybody.

This is the necessary condition to tone down the discrepancy between the official launching of Eureka and the ambitions of its assumed partners. If it can prevent French-French competition and costly struggles among Europeans and if it can progressively eliminate possible redundancies among research teams, that would already be a flattering result for a program that is still in gestation.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER COMMENTS AFTER SUMMIT MEETING

AU251927 Rome ANSA in English 1915 GMT 25 Oct 85

[Excerpt] (ANSA) New York, October 25--U.S. President Ronald Reagan can go to Geneva next month to meet Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev with "sure support" from his European allies, Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi said after meeting with Reagan and other Western leaders in New York last night. Craxi said the European leaders on hand for Thursday's talks assured Reagan of their support once they themselves had made certain that the U.S. leader was sensitive to their concerns.

Following his summit talks with Gorbachev in Geneva, Reagan will fly to Brussels to brief the U.S. NATO allies on the outcome of the meeting.

Among the worries which Reagan soothed in New York Thursday was European concern that the U.S. may not live up to anti-ballistic missile limitation commitments. But Reagan assured his Western allies that the United States was ready to publicize the results of all defensive research to the whole world in order to prevent an upset of strategic balances.

The Italian Government leader told reporters that Washington's Western allies were also afraid that the "star wars" controversy would overshadow other disarmament issues and hold back progress that could be made, for instance, in the field of limited intermediate-range strategic weapons. The U.S. announced plans Thursday to offer counter-proposals to the ones unveiled by the Soviet Union just prior to the Warsaw Pact summit meeting in Sofia.

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CSO: 5200/2531

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

ITALY'S PSI SPOKESMAN VIEWS SDI, FRICTION WITH U.S.

PM251514 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 24 Oct 85 p 3

[Report by Rocco di Biasi: "Spini: 'We Already Had Doubts About Space Weapons'"]

[Excerpt] Rome -- "The Italian Government would have refused to give a favorable response to Reagan's 'space shield' even if there had been no crisis". This was stated yesterday evening by Valdo Spini, PSI foreign affairs chief and member of the PSI Executive Committee, speaking at the conference on Italy's "problematical sovereignty" organized by the Italian Communist Youth Federation.

"Craxi's response," Spini went on, "reflected more than the effects of the present political precariousness. For some time there had been other anxieties and reasons for vigilance. One in particular -- that the space shield might disrupt the balance of forces between the powers and thus drive the USSR toward another arms race. Instead, it is necessary to seek a context that will provide guarantees to the Soviet Union, bearing in mind that in the USSR something really is stirring with respect to previous positions."

Next, Spini disclosed that immediately after the Israeli raid on Tunis and Reagan's enthusiastic comments, sharp friction occurred between the Italian Government and the United States and that Craxi's trip had been placed in jeopardy on a previous occasion: "we gave the Americans to understand," the PSI foreign affairs chief added, "that unless they reappraised their assessments Italy's presence at the summit with Reagan would be very unlikely."

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S "STAR WARS" PROGRAM ANALYZED, CRITICIZED

Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 3, 4, 5, 6 Sep 85 p 2

[Article by Colonel Stoyan Andreev: "The Pentagon's Plans for 'Star Wars' and Ideological Diversion"]

[3 Sep 85 p 2]

[Text] On 23 March 1983 R. Reagan christened his "Star Wars" program. But 2 years later, on 22 June of this year, he announced: "I don't know who thought of the name 'Star Wars,' but I would like to take those words back, since they create a false impression of aggression."

What has caused this evolution in the American president's terminology?

Such an evolution does exist, but it is not in President Reagan's terminology, but in American public opinion. In 1983, Reagan's tales about the Soviet Union as an evil empire were still alive. At that time the American movie theaters were showing the celebrated George Lucas film "Star Wars." The film was unbelievably successful. Some Americans saw it more than ten times. According to data in the NEW YORK TIMES, the film was seen by 500 million viewers! This is how favorable psychological conditions were created for allowing Reagan to adapt terminology and images from the film for one of the United States' most aggressive military programs. What is more, the film's main hero, Luke Skywalker, uses futuristic weapons to fight against an evil empire, which can be easily associated, because of Reagan's stories, with the concentrated evil of the USSR.

But the legend boomeranged, and when American society began to feel the danger in carrying out the "Star Wars" program, Reagan hastened to renounce the name.

And in order to show that building a large-scale anti-missile system is not only in the interests of the military-industrial complex, but also the United States, the Pentagon strategies created three legends, which all of the NATO propaganda broadcast, literally day and night, in all languages, to shape worldwide public opinion:

Legend No 1. In 1979, R. Reagan visited the headquarters of the joint American-Canadian civil defense center in Colorado Springs. When they

asked the general on duty what could be done if the NORAD system discovered a Soviet ballistic missile flying toward the United States, he received the response: "Nothing." This shook Reagan and it gave birth to his idea of building a highly effective anti-missile system.

Legend No 2. When in 1967 R. Reagan was elected governor of California, he visited the famous Livermore Laboratory, which developed the principles of new American weapons. After becoming acquainted with its future plans, Reagan noted that nothing was foreseen on a large scale to combat Soviet missiles, and even then he set himself the task of beginning to develop an anti-missile system.

Legend No 3. There is just one author of the "Star Wars" program: Ronald Reagan, not the military-industrial complex. The president announced that the idea for the "Star Wars" project came into his head at the same time he heard a report that the Soviet Union had launched an artificial satellite into space.

And thus the legends are created, one after another, and they are tossed out by Western propaganda, but the truth is that the development of the idea for the "Star Wars" project belongs to the entire military-industrial complex of the United States, actively aided by the most reactionary political and military-industrial circles of Western Europe and Japan.

The WASHINGTON POST wrote quite precisely on 4 August 1985 that military business (for which the military-industrial complex) had discovered space for itself.

Precisely the producers of strategic attack weapons, the giants such as Lockheed, Martin-Marietta, Hughes Aircraft, Rockwell, Boeing, General Dynamics, were busy with the so-called "defensive" space wars.

The United States' Anti-Missile Program is Nuclear and Aggressive

American propaganda, supported by a significant number of the Western European partners, has been diligently aspiring to inculcate the idea in people's consciousness that the anti-missile system that the United States is now beginning to experiment with in practice and is constructing, has a decided defensive and non-nuclear nature. Here are some of the pronouncements of the leading American political figures:

Ronald Reagan, president of the United States: "The strategic defense initiative, which I have proposed, has the goal of rendering nuclear weapons obsolete and unnecessary."

Caspar Weinberger, the United States secretary of war: "The strategic defense initiative does not increase the amount of armament, it is not even a weapon, only a harmless means of destroying weapons."

Almost without exception, Western propaganda has now begun a massive effort to sway public opinion in the name of the high moral value of the "Star Wars" program as a defensive system.

But here is a military-scientific analysis of the nature of such a system.

Destroying the enemy's intercontinental ballistic missiles, according to the plans of the authors of the "Star Wars" project, must take place basically over his territory, in the areas around his launching pads. At later stages in the missiles' flight, when the warheads and decoy targets separate, a practical struggle against large-volley rocket firing remains a task for the distant future.

Destroying the enemy's missiles must be done with powerful lasers, streams of elementary particles directed against single rocket firings; for small-volley firings plans are being made to use gamma-lasers, which represent the third generation of nuclear weapons.

The destructive capabilities of cosmic strike complexes in relation to non-maneuverable land sites, such as factories, communication and transportation junctions, and command points are a hundredfold greater, in comparison with their capabilities in relation to ballistic missiles. Thus whether they are used to destroy space, aerial, or land objects will be determined by the United States' military-political plans, not by the nature of these weapons.

And so plans are being made in the "Star Wars" project, according to a statement by the American president, to carry out pre-emptive strikes from space against sites in the territory of the Soviet Union. And all of this is called a peaceful, defensive initiative. One cannot help but bringing in here the words of the well known Soviet military observer, V. Chernyshev, in regard to the American ideological strategies: "They are apparently assuming that, with the exception of the people in Washington, the whole world consists of fools, who are capable of swallowing and digesting any propaganda soup prepared according to the White House's recipe."

In regard to the view that the cosmic strike weapons will not be nuclear, the truth is the following. The gamma-lasers, which are designed to destroy the missiles that are fired in a volley, are the most modern nuclear weapon, in which almost all the power of the nuclear explosion is turned into gamma rays. The destructive capabilities of such a nuclear weapon are enormous. According to the father of this new nuclear weapon, Edward Teller, its capacity is equal to the energy of the sun, gathered in a reflector 600 kilometers in diameter! This weapon is more suited to striking at land sites from space than ballistic missiles. In order to create it, the Americans are conducting unprecedented underground nuclear tests. Precisely for this reason they have refused to follow the extremely constructive Soviet measure of limiting the testing of nuclear weapons between 6 August 1985 and 1 January 1986. The USSR has halted all nuclear tests. The president of the United States has announced "that the United States cannot follow the USSR's example, because it would mean compensating for the Soviets' ten-year lag in the area of nuclear combat warheads." But the same day the NEW YORK TIMES (31 July 1985) wrote that "The United States cannot halt underground nuclear testing for two reasons: lest the development of the gamma-lasers for the "Star Wars" project be halted; and in order

to study the factors which could decrease the destructive action of the nuclear weapon in a prolonged nuclear war."

The president's Directive No. 172 of 30 May 1985 affirms, without the cover of propaganda: "In the future we will study and experiment with the promising concepts which propose the utilization of nuclear power for acting on devices which are capable of destroying ballistic missiles."

And so the main goal of the "Star Wars" project is not to render nuclear weapons "obsolete" and unnecessary, but to add to them a new class of more destructive nuclear weapons.

This is the military-scientific and military-political truth.

[4 Sep 85 p 2]

[Text] Despite the fact that American and NATO propaganda still continues to assure the world about the defensive character of the Reagan "Star Wars" plan, Western military and political specialists, who are thinking quite realistically, openly link this project with Washington's ambitions of building the potential for carrying out a first nuclear strike.

How does this question look from the military-scientific point of view?

Despite the fact that Reagan and Weinberger officially deny that the United States does not aspire to create the potential for a first nuclear strike, the whole spectrum of military programs put forth by the current administration, and the president's directives, categorically contradict this. Here are the basic facts:

The modernization and expansion of the American nuclear arsenal essentially follows three paths: increasing capacity, precision, and impenetrability. Systems are being created, such as the MX, Midgetman, B-1B, Stealth, Trident-2 (D-5), and Pershing-2, which have the capability of destroying, with "surgical" accuracy, well defended sites, including intercontinental ballistic missiles in well fortified silos.

The following two tasks have been incorporated into the anti-missile system: defending one's own rockets and nuclear weapons at the launch sites, and destroying in the air the rockets aimed and fired by the enemy in revenge.

When we add to these plans the program for building a system for guiding strategic forces under the conditions of a prolonged nuclear war, we see that the current American administration hopes to build an offensive and defensive complex for carrying out a first nuclear strike, in the hopes of avoiding (neutralizing) a crushing blow in response from the enemy.

Thus C. Weinberger has announced with bravado that "the United States will spend whatever is necessary to achieve supremacy over the USSR." And Reagan is even more arrogant: "We would be the greatest fools in the world if we did not create what is currently being offered by our scientific and industrial potential."

It is quite evident that the basic military aim of Reagan's "Star Wars" program is to destroy the military balance which has been established between the USSR and the United States through the creation of a unified offensive-defensive complex.

The Danger of Unsanctioned Nuclear Attack

In the Western press they have published the points of view of leading scholarly and military specialists, such as Nobel laureate Hans Bethe, Richard Garwin, Carl Sagan, the American reserve admiral Noel Heller, that realizing the American plans for constructing an anti-missile system greatly increases the probability of an unsanctioned nuclear attack. What are their scientific-technical and military operative arguments?

This question was seriously discussed in scientific circles in the West in connection with the United States' military-industrial complex's efforts to attract a group of English scientists at the University of Edinburgh, who are working on problems related to artificial intelligence, to participate in their space programs. It was thought that the leading Western country in this area was not Japan or the United States, but England. Thus the effort was made to bring this unit into the general assignment of creating an automatic system for the large-scale anti-missile system. To their credit, the scientists from the University of Edinburgh rejected the American request on moral and ethical grounds, despite the great sums that had been offered them.

What does it mean to create an automated anti-missile system?

It means automatically gathering data on the movement of the enemy's missile, automatically evaluating the potential danger created by it, and automatically making a decision about countermeasures (without any human participation), automatic guidance of the means of its destruction, independent of the fact that the missile is over the enemy's territory or its territorial waters. And taking into account that any of these computerized, automated stages of missile destruction just pointed out are subject to error, despite the general one in 10 million chance of starting a world nuclear war without any human participation, for purely technical reasons, the danger is quite high. That this could be ignored in military-technical and military-political figuring. This is a nightmarish prospect, but it has been brought about by the objective development of the arms race, to which all of humanity has been subjected by the American military-industrial complex. Indeed American imperialism first created and implemented the cruise missiles, including those with supersonic speed and those based on submarines. Using them, it is possible to initiate a sudden attack in 3 to 4 minutes. During this time, missiles have to be uncovered, so that defensive strategy can be worked out, to evaluate the overall military-political situation, and make a decision at the highest political-military level about a rapid counter strike. In a practical sense, it is not possible to comply with this requirement if everything is not fully automated.

But this means handing over the fate of mankind to the power of computers (artificial intelligence)! The idea itself is cannibalistic, and it is the natural result of the American plans for building a large-scale anti-missile system. Thus not only have Western scientists rebelled, such as those in Edinburgh, but also other Western military specialists, who have realistically evaluated the growing dangers. One of the leading English specialists from the University of Edinburgh, Dr. A. Bundy, announced: "My colleagues and I want our knowledge and experience to be used for the betterment of humanity, not for organizing doubtful enterprises which could evoke a catastrophe for all of humanity."

Military-scientific analyses show that carrying out the American plans for building a large-scale anti-missile system would not only not free mankind from the nuclear nightmare, as Reagan has arrogantly tried to reassure us, but it would really increase the danger of a nuclear apocalypse.

How the Pentagon Strategists are Planning to Replace the American Military Strategy of Guaranteed Mutual Destruction with Guaranteed Mutual Survival

Indeed during June of this year, the secretary of war for the United States, C. Weinberger, announced: "The aim of the strategic defense initiative put forth by President Reagan is nothing more or less than to replace our strategy of guaranteed mutual destruction with a strategy of guaranteed mutual survival."

What is contained in the American military strategy of guaranteed mutual destruction is well known to us. According to data of the London Institute for Strategic Research, so far more than 11,000 monographs and scholarly publications have appeared on this topic. But what is represented by the strategy of guaranteed mutual survival, in the views of the leaders in the White House and Pentagon, can only be guessed at from certain of their ideological-speculative declarations. Apparently we are dealing with Reagan's affirmation that the large-scale anti-missile system that the United States is now beginning to build will render nuclear weapons obsolete and pointless (unthinkable), since every carrier of a nuclear warhead will be destroyed by this system.

From the propaganda point of view, this declaration represents a regular and awkward attempt at ideological concealment of the United States' true aims, which were posited with the implementation of offensive space units. Many people are not fooled by the political naivete of this declaration, and thus its author, President Reagan, in his declaration of 13 July on the questions of the United States' right to build an offensive space unit, did not mention this motif at all. But as we know, this is precisely a fundamental part of his infamous speech on 23 March 1983, when he announced his "Star Wars" program. On the contrary, a new motif appeared: "The necessity of constructing an American defensive-attack unit, which could respond to Soviet strategic provocation." The scientific ideologue of the "Star Wars" project, the creator of the American nuclear bomb, and a close personal friend of President Reagan, Edward Teller, explained: "The story that the strategic defense initiative was to serve in the liquidation of nuclear weapons on earth was spread for internal consumption in

America with the aim of disarming the adherents to anti-war movements and to force them to accept the 'Star Wars' project."

Nothing more precise than this can be uttered. And still these are all just statements. Here is an excerpt from Presidential Directive No 172 of 20 May 1985, which has as its tasks, according to the prefatory part, "to introduce clarity in the planning of the stages of the star wars and to prevent the peaceful rhetoric of the state figures from becoming confused by propaganda." This directive, which will determine the real policy of the United States in the following decade in the area of the militarization of space, affirms the strategy of guaranteed mutual destruction as a basis, only at a "more acute level."

A military-scientific analysis shows that the primary task of the large-scale anti-missile defense system is to defend silos that contains intercontinental ballistic missiles with up to ten warheads apiece (and not their disarmament!).

Constructing a large-scale anti-missile system will be accompanied by a sharp rise in the quantitative relationship of the United States' nuclear rocket potential (the MX missiles, cruise missiles with nuclear warheads, underwater-based missiles on Trident-1 and Trident-2 submarines, the B-1B strategic bombers, Stealth, and the guidance systems for strategic forces under the conditions of a prolonged nuclear war).

For this reason the former United States secretary of defense during the Kennedy administration, who first openly admitted the senselessness and danger of the arms race for the United States, evaluated the Reagan "Star Wars" plan in this way: "The Reagan 'strategic defense initiative,' if realized by the administration, would clearly aim at ensuring the indestructibility of the United States and then lead to conducting a first nuclear strike."

[5 Sep 85 p 2]

[Text] This is the ideological and military-technical content of the affirmation of Reagan and Weinberger that they are striving to replace the strategy of guaranteed mutual destruction with a strategy of guaranteed mutual survival.

Unfortunately, many Western political and military figures are still demeaning themselves to show that this is so, despite the fact that they see, in the plans of the Pentagon, that the European nations will again play the role of nuclear hostages.

The Future of the Arms Race

The basic argument of the opponents of the "Star Wars" program, both in the East and the West, is that it will sharply stimulate the arms race and drastically worsen the international situation.

What is the military-scientific evidence of this evaluation's correctness?

The basic military-scientific evidence of the fact that Reagan's "Star Wars" program is decisively quickening the arms race and increasing the danger of a global nuclear war can be divided into two groups: the quantitative and the qualitative factors.

Since the large-scale anti-missile system is an inseparable part of Reagan's so-called offensive-defensive potential, it is natural to assume that in order to maintain a military-technological balance, the Soviet Union will increase the number of its missiles and nuclear warheads to match the number that could be destroyed by the anti-missile system.

Science shows that it is impossible to build a totally impenetrable anti-missile shield, and that the upper limit of probability of destroying small volleys of intercontinental missiles will not go over 70 percent in the next 40 to 50 years. And with larger volleys of missiles, this number will decrease significantly.

Secondly, in addition to the group of quantitative factors, we can point to the fact that this system will not be effective against supersonic cruise missiles and operative tactical rockets for three to seven minutes from the time of the combat task. This will evidently strongly stimulate the perfection and production of this class of weapons.

In addition to the group of qualitative factors, we can point to the creation of totally new systems of nuclear warhead missiles, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles with "casual" trajectories, the construction of a new generation of ballistic missiles, which have over 20 warheads guided automatically, and carrying just as many maneuverable warheads. This system will be almost untouched by the Reagan anti-missile system. Now being drafted is the construction of two new systems of weapons, which have arisen precisely because of the "Star Wars" plan. This relates to the so-called space mines and the electronic space units for radio resistance, which could make space generally unusable, including militarily active and informational functions.

Since as yet we cannot see if the anti-missile system envisaged by the United States will fight against the carriers of tactical nuclear weapons, this will also be reflected sharply in the development of these systems of weapons.

In addition to the implementation of attack units in space, questions are being raised anew about the qualitative perfection of conventional weapons.

Efforts are being stepped up to develop and implement conventional weapons in the area of 300 to 400 kilometers of activity and destructive effect, equal to that of tactical nuclear weapons.

As we can see, almost no weapons system has been neglected; each of them has been stimulated by the United States' interest in conducting research on the "Star Wars" program, and these give birth to totally new systems

of weapons, i.e., they give rise to a total arms race. Perhaps this is one of the cannibalistic goals of the American military-industrial complex.

But precisely this presents humanity, including the American people, with new dangers.

The Program and Scientific-Technical Progress

One of the basic motifs in the White House's propaganda about the usefulness of carrying out the "Star Wars" program is that it will lead to major scientific and technological achievements, which can be applied in the civilian sphere with great effect. What do scientific-technical analyses show about this affirmation?

Let us first introduce the arguments of those who support the "Star Wars" program:

Argument No 1: Every million dollars spent on the Apollo program (for landing an American on the moon) eight years later yielded 24 million dollars in additional growth for the United States. Consequently, this size of capital investment is extremely profitable for the United States' entire economy.

Argument No 2: The new technologies laid the foundation for building offensive space complexes, such as laser, radiational, and nuclear, new materials and computer units with efficiency incomparably higher quality than today's, cannot be created except within the framework of a state-military budgetary organization. And based precisely on these achievements, there will follow construction of transportation, communications, and technologies for the 21st century.

Therefore, the "Star Wars" program is profitable from the economic point of view not only for the military-industrial complex, but for the whole country, for the entire West, even for the whole world.

Argument No 3: Only by means of resolving such a colossally complex scientific-technical problem can the United States create the scientific potential to guarantee its leadership around the world in the 21st century.

Let us examine all these arguments individually. The Apollo program was a peaceful endeavor, not a military one, and thus it cannot be compared to the "Star Wars" project. The former program helped to create the fourth generation of computers, highly efficient fuels, the technical basis for automated systems with remote control, and many other problems in contemporary computer science. With the "Star Wars" project they are planning to create superpowerful lasers, mighty, portable amplifiers for refueled parts, new materials, rapid functioning integrated circuits, various data processors with super-high sensitivity and corresponding mathematical-machine programmed units.

In the estimate of the United States Council of National Priorities, only ten percent of the tasks foreseen in the "Star Wars" program can have a civilian application. The remaining ones have a purely military character. This argument essentially shows how profitable the fundamental research on the peaceful utilization of space is, and the Soviet Union has called on the United States to include itself in this, especially in realizing large joint projects.

An analysis of the second argument shows only that the current leaders of the United States is totally within the grip of the military-industrial complex, which looks upon the development of the country, and indeed of the world only through the prism of its egotistical and harmful class interests. In the view of American specialists, carrying out the "Star Wars" program will cost the American people around 3 trillion dollars. Carl Sagan, the American astronomer known all over the world, was asked which scientific problems could be solved if this money were used there instead. To this question he said: "Even with the technology and scientific conditions we have now, by using this money, we could send a spaceship with a scientific expedition to Mars, create a permanently functioning space station on the moon, send an investigative spaceship in the direction of the sun, create a permanent space laboratory for space research orbiting around the earth, and with the remaining several hundred million dollars we could take care of the most pressing American social problems."

The comparison is truly astounding! And it applies precisely to everyone in America and the world on a mass scale.

By carrying out such projects, in which many nations could participate, we could resolve scientific problems that would ensure the successful satisfaction on mankind's global needs, not realizing plans for its destruction.

We must also add the strong argument of the opponents of the "Star Wars" program that the eventual effects of this program on civilian industry will be incomparably smaller than the huge losses which will result for diverting money and highly trained specialists.

This is the opinion of one of the United States' top economists, Prof Edward Mansfield: "We can hardly doubt that the profits promised to civilian industry by the military program will be comparable with those which would have resulted if the money had been given directly to it."

According to the data in the report just cited, over 250 major civilian projects, developed on the basis of the latest achievements of scientific progress are waiting in line for financing, but without hope.

According to the data of Prof. K. Lichtenberg, around 40 percent of the needs of civilian firms for specialists with top training is unsatisfied because the specialists are being swallowed up by military corporations and the Pentagon. Thus the United States is beginning to lose its leading positions in a number of branches, such as domestic electronics, automobile manufacturing, transport machine building, etc.

[6 Sep 85 p 2]

[Text] The analysis of the first two motifs gives a satisfactory response to the third question. We must also add that the high military standards and stern organization which the realization of any military program calls for, can be introduced and already are being introduced in the United States, Japan, and Western Europe in carrying out civilian programs. Thus this condition is not an additional motif for the adherents to the "Star Wars" program.

A Crude Violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Treaty Between the USSR and the United States

R. Reagan, C. Weinberger, and G. Schultz constantly assures American and world public opinion, with reason and without, that realizing the "Star Wars" program would not be a violation of the ABM defense treaty between the USSR and the United States, signed in 1972. The motifs introduced by the White House and the Pentagon to affirm this are the following:

Up to now the program has had a research nature; the principally new components in the "Star Wars" project are not treated in the treaty. What is more, the creation of such components is even stimulated by the treaty. The Soviet Union has already built such a system, and the Americans have done the same, while offering the treaty for review.

We have to note that the United States is interested in this treaty working, but they try to see that its limiting clauses apply only to the Soviet Union.

Let us review the scientific-technical and military-legal aspects of the American affirmations.

Is the current activity of the American military-industrial complex directed toward carry out the "Star Wars" program only a scientific experiment?

It is well known that scientific experiments has as an aim only demonstrating the principle of activity in a given device or the probability of a definite physical law under laboratory conditions in a so-called functioning model.

Almost none of the characteristics generally accepted by the whole civilized world are at work in the experiment here. Lasers, amplifiers for refueled parts, systems for maintenance and guidance, radar and infrared units with corresponding production documentation are being created. Radar and infrared systems are unique types of equipment and are made only in a certain quantity, and so it is in principle difficult to draw sharp demarcation lines for them in terms of research, experiments, and introduction into armaments. The same is true of certain types of space strike units.

This destructive capabilities of these weapons are such that one cannot even speak about considering them so-called experimental models. We should never forget that the two atomic bombs which the United States used to

destroy Hiroshima and Nagasaki were only experimental models, which did not come from a factory but from an institute.

In regard to the White House's remaining two affirmations, they can be rejected on the following military-technological grounds. Indeed the treaty does not exclude the appearance of principally new means that could replace, for example, anti-ballistic missiles. But these means must be implemented only at an agreed upon scale, i.e., only in two areas of the United States, with an effective area of 150 kilometers. But now the United States is striving to build an anti-ballistic missile system for the whole continent, which would not only violate the treaty, but bury it.

The Americans concretely accuse the Soviet Union of having built in the Krasnoyarsk rayon a powerful radar complex for discovering ballistic missiles, which would be a violation of the treaty, which limits the construction of such complexes, with the exception of those which are located along the borders of the USSR and aimed outward. The Soviet authorities have announced that indeed such a radar center is being constructed in Krasnoyarsk, but its antennas are directed toward the sky, and they have invited American specialists to convince themselves on the spot that it has function. The Americans, however, have not reacted.

It is obvious, as with the interpretation of all of the United States' international obligations, that the Americans are striving to limit their opponents, lest their own interests be harmed.

Every violation of this treaty by the United States, as announced by the head of the Soviet Army general staff, Marshal Akhromeev, will inevitably force the USSR to renew the strategic balance, by increasing its strategic attack forces and supplementing them with defensive means. The security of all nations of course suffers because of this, and here the American people are also included.

Possible Soviet Countermeasures

The statements of the top Soviet party and governmental leaders have already been published: if the United States continues to carry out its program for the militarization of space and do not agree at the negotiations in Geneva to agree on the conditions of limiting the use of offensive space units, the Soviet Union will be forced to take corresponding equivalent measures.

What might these measures be?

First let us introduce some of the statements. At a meeting with the collective from the Dnepropetrovsk Metallurgic Combine, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachov, announced: "If the Soviet Union will be placed under a real threat from space, we will find a means for effective counteraction. I am speaking quite specifically about this, let no one doubt it."

The defense minister of the USSR, Marshal S. L. Sokolov, announced on 6 May on the pages of PRAVDA that "the creation of an offensive space weapon will inevitably decrease the security of the United States itself and of its allies."

On 4 June of this year, on the pages of PRAVDA, the head of the Soviet Army's general staff, Marshal Akhromeev, wrote: "The Soviet Union will not permit military superiority, neither on the earth nor in space."

On 23 July on the pages of IZVESTIYA, the vice minister of defense for armament and technology, army general Vitaliy Shabanov, wrote: "If Washington continues to increase its efforts for practical realization of the "Star Wars" program and does not take reasonable steps to halt work in this direction, the Soviet Union will have no other recourse than taking corresponding measures. This does not mean that countermeasures will be simply copying American programs and their technological aspects. The measures will correspond to the military-political conditions created."

It is very difficult to give a prognosis of these corresponding measures which the Soviet Union could adopt to neutralize the American threat from space. In the report of Soviet scientists, prepared under the guidance of academician Sagdeev, some of the possible measures are hinted at: Increasing the number of nuclear warhead carriers and their warheads, creating weapons that would be impervious to attacks from space, introducing space mines, creating units for radioelectronic countermeasures in space. But in General Shabanov's statement, he mentions a principally new means of countermeasure, which is not foreseen in the American program. We must remember that operative Soviet thinking, which maintains military-technological progress, leads the world. We will introduce some historical facts.

Up to the beginning of the 1960's the Americans blackmailed the Soviet Union with its strategic nuclear aircraft and expected the USSR to respond with similar strategic aircraft. The strategic surprise, which the Soviet Union put forth to paralyze the American threat consisted of the creation and implementation on a mass scale of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The fundamental scientific results, on which the American space strike units are being built, come from Soviet science. This was made clear by the scientific and military leaders of the "Star Wars" program. Thus strategic surprises from the Soviet Union in terms of its countermeasures are not only expected, but are presumed. And this is one of the restraining factors in the arms race in space.

A military-scientific analysis of the scientific, technological, economic, and military-political factors, which determine the correlation of capabilities between the United States and the USSR in this field shows that the authors of the "Star Wars" project now cannot attain unilateral preeminence. And since this is so, the future conduct of the program is a mindless waste of colossal amounts of money for destroying themselves and mankind's security. Perhaps it would be very useful to return again to 1970-1972, when the Americans agreed to sign a treaty with the Soviet Union on limited ABM systems.

In working out the Safeguard program, they have counted on technological superiority in the area of powerful radar and computer technology. After they were convinced that the Soviet Union is building an analogous anti-ballistic missile complex with higher tactico-technological indicators, they agreed to sign one of the most stabilizing treaties in terms of the international situation. Perhaps this story should be repeated, but after this, huge sums are being spent and abysses of political bad faith and enmity are being created. This great truth must now be recognized and the leaders of the United States must accept it in practice. The Soviet Union has done and will do everything that depends on it to not permit an arms race to be transferred to space. The best anti-missile defense for both the United States and for all of humanity is a spirit of honest and fair agreement with the Soviet Union.

12334

CSO: 5200/3089

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

EFFORTS TO INVOLVE ISRAELI SCIENTISTS IN "STAR WARS" PROGRAM

Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 5 Sep 85 p 5

[Article by A. Ben Eliezer: "The 'Heroes of Death' Are Not Tired"]

[Text]. In the days when the peoples of the whole world are marking the 40th anniversary of the use of the first atomic bombs against the peaceful population of the Japanese towns of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, "the father of the American hydrogen bomb," Edward Teller, has found it necessary to "honor" this American heroism with his Israeli colleagues from the scientific world.

Around 100 Israeli scientists responded to the invitation to participate in the promised scientific discussion. After the first statements, however, it became clear that he had arrived in Israel with a precisely defined mission, to recruit "brains" for the latest American program for destruction, which has been given the name "Star Wars."

With gentlemanly pedantry, E. Teller "kept to the theme" and the mass death became a link between the events in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and "Star Wars." He appeared before those present as one of those who advise President Reagan not "to put off the program." Fearing that his findings about "the tactical use of nuclear weapons" could evoke concerns among his listeners, he hastened "to reassure them" with the promise that "nuclear war would not be so terrible" and that the "first strike tactics" would destroy "only" about 30 percent of the earth's population. Thus, he added, in contradiction to Soviet propaganda, "there would be opportunities for the human race to continue to exist...."

The eminent professor, of course, would not have come to Tel Aviv if he had not been interested in Israeli participation in the crazy plans. After he had met with the Israeli leaders for lengthy discussions, the details of whose contents were forbidden to be published, E. Teller announced to the press and television that he had completed his visit to the country with a good feeling, since "the Israelis understood the questions of defense better than the populations of any other state in the Western world." E. Teller could not hide his disappointment that except for Israel and Portugal no other nation has wanted to "buy" the idea of this type of "defense," which in practice increases the threat of a new world war. But to the "people who had won his heart," the Israeli leaders, he sent

a free offer: Israel could build on its territory equipment with laser rays, which they could use to counteract Soviet rockets....

It must be admitted that this society, which has been buffeted by economic crisis, did not react with the expected alarm in regard to the visit of Reagan's emissary, and perhaps he and the Israeli leaders precisely had counted on this. But in certain newspapers there appeared calls for peace-loving efforts, in which writers called on "people with a clear conscience, doctors, academicians, journalists and public figures, who value human life as a supreme good and whose greenback dollars still have not been tainted, to count themselves for disarmament, which is the only thing that can ensure the existence of humanity. Who can guarantee that Teller's 30 percent will not include the Israeli nation?" concluded one of the appeals.

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SPACE ARMS AND SDI

BRIEFS

DANISH INTEREST IN EUREKA--Biotechnology and electronics firms make up the majority of the more than 100 Danish companies which wish to take part in EUREKA, the large technological research project initiated by France. Christian Rovsing, Regnecentralen, and Soren T. Lyngsoe are among the firms which have applied to the Office of Research, but small and medium-scale businesses also want to participate. The size of the contribution of the Danish government is still uncertain. It depends on how large an amount the Danish firms themselves plan to earmark for the research project. Minister of Education Bertel Haarder, who has been given the unofficial title of Minister of Research, and Minister of Industry Ib Stetter will discuss the plans to join EUREKA in greater detail at a meeting on Wednesday, 30 October. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 25 Oct 85 Sec III p 4]

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U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

BRIEFS

FRG'S GENSCHER ON BRUSSELS MEETING--Bonn--The West European allies are anticipating the superpower summit in Geneva with much greater optimism after U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz had committed himself politically in Brussels on Tuesday by agreeing with the allies on "consultations and negotiations with the Soviets." Thus in the view of diplomatic circles in Bonn, government circles in Washington that wanted to give a more generous interpretation to the ABM Treaty have been pushed into the background. Consequently, a very difficult phase of the consultations with Washington has been overcome, being replaced with a new and more reliable arrangement. The diplomatic circles said that Genscher had returned from Brussels "extraordinary satisfied." The federal foreign minister clearly assumed that Shultz, with the agreement of the U.S. President, could push through the unchanged adherence to the ABM Treaty. An extended interpretation, which suggested that development and testing of ABM systems were permitted, had been strongly rejected by the European allies in Brussels in order not to undermine a basic condition for the Geneva talks. [Excerpts] [Hamburg DPA in German 1350 GMT 16 Oct 85 LD]

KOHL MESSAGES TO REAGAN, GORBACHEV--Bonn, 22 Oct (DPA)--Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl has, according to his own statements, "given a series of stimuli" in letters to both sides for the meeting planned in 4 weeks between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet party leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Geneva. He wants to consolidate these stimuli further in the upcoming discussions with Reagan in New York. Kohl said this on Tuesday in an interview with Second German Television. He gave no details. For Geneva it was "the German desire," with the Europeans, that the discussion be carefully prepared and that "we achieve, as far as possible, a positive outcome for the climate between both world powers and some real headway for controlled disarmament and detente." During the planned bilateral meeting, he wishes to speak with Reagan about the general conditions for strategic missile defense in space (SDI). He was certain that "we will find a reasonable way here." The interview was made available to DPA by the FEDERAL PRESS AGENCY. [Text] [Hamburg DPA in German 1741 GMT 22 Oct 85 LD]

U.S.-USSR DISARMAMENT POSITIONS--Both the United States and the Soviet Union are making efforts to draw world attention toward disarmament with the approach of the Reagan-Gorbachev summit meeting in Geneva. Both sides [words indistinct] that next month's meeting will probably not bring about the desirable results. Speaking before the United Nations General Assembly last Thursday, President Reagan said that there are clear differences between the two countries over major issues, such as human rights and regional conflicts in the world. Meanwhile, Moscow is worried about the United States space satellite "Star Wars" system. President Reagan mentioned Cambodia, Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, and Ethiopia as countries most afflicted by chaos as a result of Soviet intervention, saying that efforts should be made to prevent the Soviet Union from supplying more arms to these countries. Reagan considered that the nuclear arms race is more dangerous than various international conflicts. On the other hand, other countries in the world want a moratorium on nuclear testing and the deployment of medium range guided missiles, a halt on nuclear testing in space, and a ban on the use of chemical weapons, and the creation of a nuclear free zone in Europe and the Balkans. [passage omitted on antinuclear demonstration in London]. [Excerpt]. [Jakarta Domestic Service in Indonesian 0700 GMT 27 Oct 85 BK]

/12913
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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

DUTCH DEFENSE MINISTER ON CRUISE MISSILES, SDI

Amsterdam DE TIJD in Dutch 20 Sep 85 pp 18-23

[Interview with Job de Ruiter, Dutch Defense Minister, by Fréenk van der Linden; date and place not specified; ellipses as in original; passages enclosed in slantlines emphasized in original: "Job De Ruiter, 'Veto Right on Use of Cruise Missiles Is Politically Undesirable'"]

[Excerpt] "We must not create the feeling that the Netherlands is a member of NATO so that when it counts it can block things and get out of everything." Thus, definitively, /no Dutch veto/ on the use of cruise missiles. But government participation in SDI should not be expected. Further: how the Americans can get around a treaty with the Netherlands, and how a cabinet that includes PvdA [Labor Party] is possible despite everything. A prickly meeting with CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] Defense Minister Job de Ruiter. "That is the way it is, take it from me."

From the start there is irritation in the air. The /defens(iv)e/ minister--you can say that again.

--During the demonstration introducing the People's Petition, your brother, composer Wim de Ruiter, a member of the recommending committee of the "Cruise Missiles, No" Committee, said that we are governed by people blind to the dangers of spiraling armaments. Does a statement like that bother you?

"It would be bad if I were influenced by that. I do not hold my position to serve family purposes. I want to leave it at that. I keep private matters like that out of the public eye."

--One more small question while we are at it. It is true that your wife and children are going along with the Petition?

"I speak only for myself, and I am not signing."

--Is CDA Floor Leader De Vries not arousing unfair suspicions when he states that the organizers of the Petition are assuring the people that it will be binding on the government and on Parliament, and that they are thus doing something that will harm our parliamentary democracy?

"I have never seen the organizers do anything like that directly. From a democratic standpoint, the Petition is beyond reproach. But 'arousing unfair suspicions,' I find that too severe. I think that De Vries meant to say that under our constitutional law, gathering signatures like that represents nothing more than an appeal to the cabinet and to Parliament. /Totally/ in agreement there. To suggest just a bit--and this you certainly do see--that the Petition will be binding on the formal decision-making process is wrong."

"I approach it like this: decisions must be made according to the existing method. And the Petition is not part of that method. Those are the rules, that is how we have to do it. In addition, there is this: you govern on the basis of your understanding of the facts. That understanding is not increased by this action. Nobody can expect a government to do things that it does not agree with just because it receives X number of signatures. What is the duty of the government, is to take such appeals seriously."

--Nonetheless: one signature or five million, it makes no difference.

"Right. The power of numbers as such cuts no ice with me. If you let that prevail, then you are cutting the ground out from under the government." De Ruiter says he is concerned about "the really /very/ fundamental, far-reaching antitheses, the gulf" caused by the nuclear weapons debate in the Netherlands. "There appears to be little chance of reconciliation, of bridging over differences."

--To a great extent our defense policy is to blame for that. As minister of justice you were still fond of the pretty tales about how the government, the legislator had to keep pace with social developments. Now you ignore them.

"I have not changed my mind. But justice is primarily a national affair, while defense is strongly international in nature. Just think about NATO. You have to take more things into account, so to speak."

--Is that enough of an excuse to make decisions that run contrary to social developments?

"No, no, no. I did not say that. After all, in the final analysis the NATO countries determine the nature and extent of their participation in the alliance on the basis of their own policy."

--/In that case/ why are you nonetheless carrying out a policy that runs contrary to an important trend in society? For years now opinion polls have shown that most Dutch are against the cruise missiles. Can you ignore that fact?

"I /know/ very well that you want to take that attitude, but I take a different one. Let me repeat: we have democratic rules in this country, and I am sticking to them. And those opinion polls.... If you would analyse more closely what the population thinks, you would see that it is much more nuanced. The game of majorities and minorities in such polls seems dubious to me. Yes, I take it with a grain of salt. The results depend very much on the approach you take. Well, that makes nonsense of questions like 'Why do you think you can go against the majority?' Irritated: "So I cannot comment further on that."

Over a month to go yet. Then the nuclear warhead will hit the fan. Then the government says it will be necessary to decide to station the 48 cruise missiles on Dutch territory, since the Soviet Union has ignored the government's gesture of good will (no stationing if on 1 November 1985 there are 378 or fewer SS-20's deployed operationally), and since there is just as little chance of an arms control agreement between Moscow and Washington. De Ruiter, obviously still a jurist at heart: "Even so, it is still possible that the Russians will do what we want."

When the cruise missiles once arrive (in 1988 according to the plan), some say that it will mean the end of Dutch sovereignty. The argument is as follows. In our six current nuclear weapons systems, the nuclear warheads are American property, the delivery systems Dutch. Further, we operate them. We have a say in NATO on possible use of these atomic weapons, and can withdraw them from the alliance if we wish to. In any case we have these weapons in our hands in wartime /right up to/ the very final stage of deliberation about using them. At that final stage the President of the United States must consult the allies about firing

them. That is to say, /if there is time to do so/, otherwise he decides by himself. But since we have these weapons in our /own/ care, from a purely practical point of view we can still block their use if we do not agree to it.

In the case of the cruise missiles things will probably be different. They will /also/ be incorporated into the NATO command structure (for this news from De Ruiter's own mouth see the sidebar [sidebar omitted in translation]), but they will be U.S. property in their entirety and will be operated by U.S. soldiers. For the first time in history, nuclear weapons in our country that we do not really have control over ourselves. And it does not appear that there will be a formal Dutch veto right on their use. The conclusion of the critics: good-bye national sovereignty. And is it not a constitutional duty to preserve that sovereignty? Of course it would be possible to amend the Constitution, but in order to do so the cabinet needs a majority of at least two thirds in the [Second] Chamber, which is not attainable, given the relative strengths in Parliament.

Politically Undesirable

"A very incorrect line of argument," says De Ruiter. "The real question is not whether it conflicts with our sovereignty, but whether it is compatible with the Constitution /as such/. We have brought this question up before the Council of State, and it came to the conclusion that allowing the cruise missiles on Dutch territory is not in conflict with our Constitution, provided you incorporate the whole into the NATO framework."

--We could have a legal debate about that (the curious should also consult the sidebar on this). But the real question is whether the Netherlands will really not be able to block the Americans if they want to shoot off cruise missiles from here, against our will, against what Reagan calls the "evil empire." Well then, the government is negotiating with the United States about the stationing treaty; does it want a double key, does it want a Dutch veto right on the use of those 48 cruise missiles?

"No, we think that is politically undesirable. Look, you can approach the problem of possible use of those weapons by asking 'What all can the Netherlands do to prevent it?' but that absolutely must not be the tone you take when you are part of an alliance. We must not create the feeling that the Netherlands is a member of NATO so that when it counts it can block things and get out of everything. If you constantly want to look for ways to do that, you might better ask why you are not leaving NATO. And that is nonsense."

--According to rumor the government thinks it insufficient for the cruise missiles simply to be incorporated into the NATO command structure. Thus the Netherlands attempted at any rate to have included in the treaty a passage to the effect that the United States could use them /only/ if it had taken "explicit note" of Dutch views on that use. That did not work out, it was necessary to stick with the standard phrase "consultation if time permits."

"I will not say anything else about a treaty that has still not been concluded."

--Would you personally be intellectually, emotionally able to order a nuclear missile fired?

"I cannot imagine the situation. Thus cannot give you an answer."

Getting around the Treaty

--I still want to come back to the treaty. However it reads, the Americans can get around it. A high military official pointed out to me that the cruise missiles are mobile weapons that in wartime will be moving about constantly. According to him "it is perfectly obvious" that at the supreme moment they will no longer be in the Netherlands ("You do not have much room to maneuver here") but rather in West Germany. In that case it will not be our treaty but the German-American agreement that governs their use.

Surprised: "That is a.... That is an excessively speculative question. You could just as well say they will be fired from the moon."

--Who knows? But /is/ that correct? Does our treaty then go out of effect, so to speak?

"What makes that unlikely is that the Americans are very much interested in spreading these weapons out over a number of NATO countries."

--It was primarily political reasons behind that: NATO must show itself united. Everybody in the same boat.

"Listen, behind this speculation is the suspicious idea that the Americans might want to use some little dodge to get out of a treaty. I distance myself completely from that."

--Will the 48 always stay inside our boundaries or not?

"I am not saying that they will never cross the border. I am saying that we are making rules for the /Dutch/ situation, for inside /our/ boundaries, yes, because that other possibility has not come up, and thus has not been considered."

--In that case it might be useful to /bring/ it up. A tip for the opposition.

Drily: "Anybody is free to do so."

--A few months ago in TROUW you said: "We are not planning to make provision in the treaty for it to be renounced quickly, nor for the possibility of renegotiation." You do not want PvdA to be able to undo the agreement quickly: "Living up to treaties is the cornerstone of any coalition." Will you get what you want?

"Naturally we are not about to build in all kinds of things just to make sure that we end up with a piece of paper that in fact is of no significance at all, right? I do not think that after it is concluded it will be possible to renounce the treaty in a moment."

--Agreements are agreements, OK. On the other hand: you really cannot put a treaty like this together in such a way that a country cannot get out of it? After all, that is not what you call acting in the spirit of parliamentary democracy?

"I do not agree with you on that. You have to grasp that international agreements are made under parliamentary control: the government will present this treaty to be approved in legal form."

--But...

"/Just/ let me say what I want to say, and we will soon be done. Naturally it will not be a treaty for eternity; such treaties have always turned out to be a scrap of paper. So there may well be a certain possibility of renouncing it."

--Just that renunciation within a few years will not be possible.

"That sounds like a reasonable idea to me. Let me repeat: you have to make agreements with the United States on the basis of trust, and not just think: how can we get out of it as quickly as possible?"

Noises in PvdA

--If a new cabinet wants to suspend or renounce the treaty with the United States, you will not join it. But what happens if after the elections PvdA, for instance because the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting is a success, says the following: "Once again there is hope of a reduction in nuclear weapons in Europe, we want to be in the government, hence we will take the cruise missile decision as a given, we can always get out if there is still no agreement when the time comes to deploy them (1988)"? I already hear those noises in PvdA.

"A successful summit conference might lead to arms control agreements, which we would also benefit from. Maybe even before 1988, yes. We must not drop the line we have taken, but in the meantime let us hope that in the end we do not have to station the cruise missiles after all. The inventions of those opposing our decision--the /strangest/ things, even an ad hoc amendment to the Constitution--have given life to the idea that our ideal is 'Oh, please, let us station the cruise missiles.' But that decision is not a goal in itself, it is precisely intended to lead through negotiations to a reduction in armaments in Europe. Hence the term 'NATO /two-track/ decision.' In short: we welcome every ray of hope. Actually I find it a pity that PvdA, as you just said, makes a connection between the possibility of such a ray of hope (a successful summit meeting at the end of November) and the wrangling over the formation of a government in the Netherlands. That discussion is already /so/ highly charged, you must not load this on top of it as well. Nonetheless: it would be bad if the election turned out in such a way that we found ourselves ungovernable. Hence, every effort--including this one then--to prevent us from slamming the doors shut on one another is a good thing. If there is an opening that removes an obstacle between parties, then it has my support in principle."

The minister tells us that the cabinet will inform Parliament about the main points of the Dutch-American treaty ("well before the middle of October"). Debates will follow, the "November 1 conclusion" will be drawn, and then a treaty text will have to be produced as quickly as possible. The Council of State will still have to advise on that, so all in all it will be the start of 1986 before the Second Chamber passes on the definitive text of the treaty. "It will be presented to the Chamber with signatures from the U.S. and Dutch sides," says the minister. "At that point nothing else can be altered in it, so it will be 'take it or leave it'--the usual procedure with treaties."

--You will be short on time if the American Congress wants to make it a treaty (Congress has to pass on it) rather than an agreement (only has to be signed by Reagan). Which will it be?

"I see it coming out as an agreement."

We could almost have overlooked them, the six existing Dutch nuclear weapons systems, that is (F-16's, atomic mines, Navy patrol aircraft, Nike air defense missiles, 203 mm antitank guns, Lance missiles). In connection with the cruise missile question there are to be decisions about these nuclear armaments. What has already been decided is that the Nikes will be replaced by conventional Patriot missiles. Besides that, the obsolete atomic mines will be eliminated. VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy] thinks that is quite enough; CDA wants more.

--The essential thing in this connection is the report that NATO Commander Rogers will present shortly. In 1983 the allies, meeting at Montebello, Canada, asked for a note stating which 1400 of the 6000 tactical nuclear warheads could be eliminated from a military point of view. Lubbers said in the NRC [HANDELSBLAD]: The Netherlands has pretty much committed itself to the results of Rogers' study.

"To be honest, I found that a pretty feeble interpretation of what really happened there. You will understand that I sat there and listened /very/ carefully with my little Dutch politician's ears. Look, the NATO ministers said: let us reduce the total number of nuclear warheads in Western Europe by 1400 before 1990. A very general and excellent /political-military/ decision to which we are truly committed. Well, soon Rogers will come up with purely /military/ advice along the lines of 'you can take this away in this

country and leave that in that country.' That is advice to which we are not committed. To be sure, that is /one/ thing the politicians will take into consideration when they discuss just which 1400 to choose."

--That decreases by a great deal the importance of Rogers' statements on this point. He has made no secret of the fact that in his eyes the Netherlands should content itself with eliminating the Nikes and the atomic mines. Do you share his opinion?

Pained look. "I cannot say anything about that at this stage." NATO, led by Rogers, is not only demanding that the Netherlands keep most of its nuclear weapons systems, but in addition is also pressing to have the 155 mm guns of the Dutch army corps in West Germany modified to fire nuclear shells. Since 1979 PvdA, D'66 [Democrats '66], and CDA have repeatedly spoken out against such a new nuclear weapons system. CDA defense specialist Frinking recently said in HET BINNENHOF: "We are immovable. That will not happen, no matter what." Rogers would be happy to see the 155 mm guns converted to nuclear purposes as part of the cruise missile/nuclear weapons package. What will the Dutch government do? De Ruiter: "It is totally out of the question. The fact is that if it should unexpectedly turn out that we have to decide to deploy the cruise missiles, then we will not take on other systems in addition."

Star Wars

--SDI, Star Wars, the space shield against missiles. Or else: the latest intensification of the arms race. A decision about government participation still has to be made.

The minister lets it be known that the government very probably will not participate in SDI, but he says he wants that to be phrased as follows in this report of our talk: "For the time being we will continue to raise critical questions about the political-strategic consequences of that system. Dutch business, however, will not be forbidden to accept SDI-related contracts."

--Former Defense Minister Van Mierlo points out that an American SDI shield, whether or not water-tight, not only would affect the equilibrium of mutual assured destruction but also would disturb the coupling between American and European security concerns. Specifically: if a space shield protects the United States but not Western Europe, then it will be possible for the Americans to attack the Soviet Union with their cruise missiles in Europe and still be able to keep New York and their strategic missiles intact.

"Oh, certainly, although the Americans are not going to just up and attack the Soviet Union. In suggesting that, you attack--unintentionally, I assume--the essence of NATO policy. But OK, we will be bringing up questions like Van Mierlo's in our discussion with the United States: what will happen in the future with us, with Europe? The answers are not in yet, it is much too unclear what is technically possible. You have to let the exploration of the technical possibilities proceed hand in hand with the question of whether those possibilities contribute to world security or not."

--Well, is that not what...

"/No, no,/ just give me a chance, otherwise we had better just stop now. I am trying to say something about the U. S.-European coupling. That coupling is mainly a political question, a question of /will/. And the Americans still want that coupling, I am convinced of that. The hundreds of thousands of American soldiers in Europe are proof of that. So when they come to us with military plans, we must ask our questions about those plans with /that/ given in mind, and not let the suspicion dominate our thinking."

--But would you go so far as to accept a nuclear shield protecting America and not Western Europe?

"No, that would mean a fundamental alteration that would not be acceptable. /Very/ risky. Fortunately that is not a problem at present, because a perfectly impenetrable wall out in space does not appear to be

possible. But even a less effective SDI would affect our position. In my opinion, logic would in that case dictate--but, of course, not everybody will find this argument equally attractive--that we think about an SDI shield in Europe. There by the way you come up against terrible technological problems, because the weapons aimed against Europe have a much shorter flight than the intercontinental ones--which makes interception difficult."

--If that European umbrella turns out in fact to be impossible, then we will be left with the problem of at least a partial decoupling. Van Mierlo states that in that case the question arises of whether you can let the Americans, who /do/ have an umbrella, decide on their own about using cruise missiles. And so the veto question comes up again.

"I do not agree with that line of argument. I already said: the coupling is mainly a matter of political will, and the very fact that the Americans are deploying their cruise missiles here is a sign of that will. SDI too does not require a veto right."

He appears to have gone the route that A. van Agt went, this Dr. J. de Ruiter: brought in as an enlightened jurist, but revealing himself after a time as a man who stays independent. It was long supposed that this politician from the ranks of ARP [Antirevolutionary Party] (formerly professor and rector at the Free University of Amsterdam) would not stand for the cruise missiles. /Now/ you can hear the people around him saying that he is just as dogmatic a NATO supporter as he earlier was a member of the Liberated Church (Article 31).

--In 1978 DE TIJD called you a man of progressive views. The headline read: "Jacob De Ruiter's Straight Path." Has that path gotten a bend in it? How progressive are you today still?

"You tell me, what is 'progressive' when we are talking about peace and security?"

--A constant, creative search for new ways to escape today's madness. Not resting content with familiar recipes. With all due respect: in recent years we have not seen you launch any ideas, not a single initiative where we thought: hey, the minister of defense is at least /trying,/ he may not succeed, but he is /doing/ something. You were silent.

And he is silent now too. Rubs his chin with his long, slender fingers. "Hmm... people's impressions are something that you cannot argue with. I... I am trying in a modest way to help get the arms control discussions to succeed.... Yes, that is not something to boast about, of course that is not so terribly spectacular.... Look, using handsome words when you know it does not work like that, presenting a splendid compromise to bring the Russians and the Americans together, ahhh.... It has to be worth doing, it has to have a chance of /succeeding./"

--Fine, making any proposal is like pole-vaulting with a matchstick, but...

"Right, that is /not/ a policy."

--...but /do/ something, show political courage.

"I do /not/ consider that a proper approach. Sorry, that is not the right basis for a conversation. Because what you are saying is total nonsense. To just ask out of the blue 'why not do something different?'--nobody can give a reply to that. Before you can talk about that, there has to /be/ an alternative, something better than what we are working with now, something moreover that is achievable."

--That is why the problems connected with defense questions demand enormous powers of thought. At the Justice Ministry you proved yourself a man that could take a lot of sharp edges off difficult questions like abortion. That is certainly one of the reasons why you ended up here. But you were unable to bring the cruise missile affair to a satisfactory conclusion, and it was Lubbers that had to conjure up a formula out of the top hat at the last moment.

Stiffly: "I do not consider it a negative thing that the Prime Minister should take the leading role in a matter that is of the very greatest importance."

--But may I ask...

Defensive gesture: "No, you can ask, but you will not get an answer."

--Oh, you already know what I was going to ask?

"Oh well, I thought I did. Just go ahead and try."

Nothing at All

--I would like to find out what your contribution was to this ingenious solution.

"Nothing at all. The Prime Minister--who is a master at this sort of thing--wanted, just like the rest of the cabinet, a decision that might mean a turning point in the arms race. And after consulting with us, he worked it out. I see that oversimplification has given it the aura of a very ordinary, veiled decision to station the cruise missiles. Our decision is a misunderstood decision."

"What I have attempted to do at Defense--and just /read/ the papers for once from the beginning--is to set the following tone: /this ministry/ is a full-fledged partner in Dutch policy, which is aimed at detente, arms control, and disarmament."

--I /have/ read it. It is a commendable effort. On the other hand you criticized the CDA program because you thought the planned growth in the defense budget was too low: you wanted three percent real growth annually, not two percent. You even made your participation in the next cabinet dependent on that.

"Yes, because I concurred with the NATO agreement: three percent."

--All in all I cannot help thinking: you /say/ you are striving for disarmament, but in the meantime you want to pump /more/ money into defense.

"It is not more /at all./"

--Three percent real growth in the budget sure /looks/ like more to me.

"Fine, fine, you can say that growth is more. But it is not more than is /needed/. Even in the past we had the feeling that given international developments we needed three percent growth. Even so we got by with a bit less. I see now, and that is something that you learn here, that... that, ahhh, /much, much/ more is needed if we really want to make a real contribution to the collective defense. The paradox is that the only real contribution we can make to preventing a war is this: to keep our defense effort at a credible level. /That/ is how things work. That is the way it is, take it from me."

The frail man on the other side eyes me wearily. He jabs a finger in my direction and says: "I just want to come back to that straight path. Am working hard on that. Do you know what the straight path is?"

--A Biblical term. You are going to say that path may have many bends, as long as a person can follow it.

"And as long as it leads to a goal, yes. You must follow that path ex-treme-ly carefully. Well, if there is /any/ example of such a path, then it must be the path of security policy. That has /so/ many bends that you sometimes wonder whether you really are going in the right direction."

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NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

DANISH SDP LEADER COMMENTS ON UPCOMING NORDIC ZONE CONFERENCE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 24 Sep 85 p 2

[Article by Thorkild Dahl: "Political Debate on Nuclear-Free-Nordic Zone"]

[Text] The conference of parliamentary representatives on the issue of a nuclear-free Nordic zone will put all the Nordic parties' points of view on the table and give us a "true picture of what responsible politicians think," said former prime minister Anker Jorgensen (Social Democratic Party), while Liberal Party group Chairman Ivar Hansen sees the conference as a means of placing the debate in the world of reality.

"We accepted the invitation to attend in order to get an idea about the positions on a nuclear-free Nordic zone. We have heard from several sources that such a zone can be realized. After the conference the debate can be continued on a more realistic basis," said Ivar Hansen yesterday at Christiansborg.

Social Democratic Party Chairman Anker Jorgensen sat at the head of the table when two representatives from each of the Nordic countries convened to plan the conference on a nuclear-free Nordic zone, which will be held at the end of November in parliamentary hall in Christiansborg.

"The conference will be attended by more than 100 parliamentary representatives from Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, The Faroe Islands and Aland Islands. Some 88 will be chosen to attend as members of the Nordic Council, but even the smallest parties that are not represented on this council will have an opportunity to send a representative," said Jorgensen.

"All political parties will participate according to their representation in the various parliaments. We have stressed that the delegates must be parliamentary representatives because this will give us a true picture of what responsible politicians think," said Jorgensen and repudiated that peace organizations will take part in the debate.

The various governments will also be invited to send a couple of ministers as well as government officials to observe the progress of the meeting.

No resolutions will be adopted during the conference.

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
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NUCLEAR TESTING

THAI WEEKLY SCORES FRENCH TESTS IN SOUTH PACIFIC

Bangkok LAK THAI in Thai 17 Oct 85 p 12

[Cartoon]



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GENERAL

ARMY DAILY EXPRESSES PESSIMISM ABOUT REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT

Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 13 Sep 85 p 4

[Article by Colonel Anastas Anastasov, military and political commentator at NARODNA ARMIYA: "With the Geneva Meeting Ahead, Time for Corrections Is Running Out" [passages in slantlines rendered in boldface in taxt]

[Text] As has already been announced, in about 2 months a high-level meeting between M. Gorbachev and R. Reagan is due to take place in Geneva. Undoubtedly, people throughout the world are expecting from this meeting some kind of substantial improvement in the relations between the two great states and, above all, a tangible stimulus to the talks between the two countries on nuclear and space weapons.

But the closer we get to the /meeting of hopes/, the more the question is raised: Will this meeting take place, and, if so, will it serve any purpose? At first glance, the question seems senseless and, to a point, provocative. Actually, it would have seemed that way about two months ago, but not today. As a matter of fact, let us first of all answer another question: Why did Washington propose this meeting, since A. Gromyko and G. Schultz had reached agreement on the fundamental problems of the Geneva negotiations on 9 January, again in Geneva, and since the third round of those negotiations was imminent? The fact is that, independent of the agreement reached in January and parallel with the negotiations, the USA continued in practice, to work on its program to perfect its arms and furiously intensified research into the so-called "strategic defense initiative", i.e., preparation for militarization of space.

On the other side, the Soviet Union took practical steps toward strengthening confidence: it stopped the positioning of medium-range rockets, announced a unilateral moratorium on all types of nuclear tests, etc., demonstrating indeed its desire to reach a mutually advantageous, equitable agreement in Geneva.

But as we can see, efforts made only by one side, that of the USSR, are insufficient. Naturally, in this situation, relations between the USSR and the USA remain in the sphere of the new "cold war", and the negotiations are marking time. Against the background of this gloomy setting, the desire of

the White House for a high-level meeting could easily be figured out. Washington clearly needs a good "warm shower" that, according to Washington, would put minds at rest not only in the USA but especially in Western Europe, where the need is even greater for some sort of agreement, however insignificant, between the USA and the Soviet Union. Obviously, the meeting in Geneva, this time at the highest level, is destined to be a tranquilizer.

In Washington, they are constantly /demonstrating their intention/ for the president's "serious attitude" toward relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, for his "readiness to meet the USSR half way in his endeavors to resolve existing problems". If only it were so. The question is, when in recent years have the words of the Washington politicians coincided with reasonable deeds?

In this case, as we know, the USA widely proclaims its desire for negotiations, talks and so on, but, at the same time, not only fails to halt its militarist programs but sharply reinforces them. It is scarcely necessary to recall here even the most important of these programs. Suffice it to mentioned the following significant fact. Just a few days after M. Gorbachev's interview with TIME was published, in which the incompatibility between desire for negotiations and practical actions for militarization of space was unequivocally emphasized, plans for the testing of the anti-satellite system ASAT were officially announced in Washington.

It turned out that the test would take place some 10 days later. Now we know that the test is planned for today, Friday, 13 September. In the name of truth, it should be pointed out that, as early as last year, the Pentagon completed two tests with this system, the first at the beginning of June. Then, the fighter plane F-15 fired a two-stage rocket "SRAM-Altair", loaded with a miniature charge with a normal explosive and an infrared sighting system. The difference between that test and the one planned for today is that now the Pentagon will fire the rocket at a real target in space, used for target practice. In other words, on the eve of the third round of negotiations in Geneva, and two months away from the high-level meeting, the USA is independently confirming its intentions by its actions, and /in spite of everything continues its "Star Wars" program/.

Actually, as M. Gorbachev pointed out in his interview, this is the first stage of a project which will create a new system of anti-satellite defence, banned in the celebrated treaty of 1972. The very size of the program (70 billion dollars planned for the next few years) shows that this is no ordinary research, but a new, qualitative leap forward in the arms race, this time into space. Because, as the Declaration in TASS stated, apropos of this, if the USA tests anti-satellite weapons against a target in space, the Soviet Union will consider itself free of its unilateral pledge not to send anti-satellite devices into space.

The logical conclusion is that if the United States fails to assess the present reality in time, both countries will fail to reach the necessary agreement to ban the arms race in space. And in the absence of such an agreement, they cannot come to terms on limitations and cuts in nuclear weapons. Because the relationship between defensive and offensive weapons is

so obvious that even the most minimal evidence is unnecessary. The very fact that in January of this year the ministers of foreign affairs of the two countries discussed new complex negotiations on three types of weapons is more than significant.

But while this is obvious to every sober-minded person, in the leading circles in Washington they deliberate in their customary fashion. They would like the Soviet Union to make a sharp, unilateral reduction in its strategic nuclear devices and to cut medium-range weapons, and they are working to this end. Moreover, the Washington politicians are constantly harping that the goal of "the strategic defense initiative" is to "wipe out the significance of nuclear ground forces", no more, no less.

Of course, that is an absurd position, which the USA is obviously using to achieve its goal of unilateral military superiority over the Soviet Union. But history shows us that this is pure illusion. For consecutive decades after World War II, the Soviet Union, even under duress, has always found the means and the way to take the necessary steps to guarantee its security and the security of its allies. It is hardly worth repeating that, even now, if needs be, all the measures taken by the USA will be followed by adequate countermeasures. But the question is, where will this path lead us? In this case, as things are going, the prospects for coming to a mutually advantageous agreement in Geneva are becoming increasingly gloomy. Obviously, from this point of view, in his interview with 'Time' M. Gorbachev was compelled to declare sincerely and openly that "if the present position of the USA on space weapons is their last word, the negotiations in Geneva ... will cease to have any meaning".

Of course, there is still time, although very little, for Washington to correct its position. The question is, however, whether there are enough reasonable politicians to break the will of the military industrial complex that they in fact serve. Rather doubtful! In this respect, the hopes for a fruitful high-level meeting in Geneva look rather weak.

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END